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THE AMENDED FEDERAL RULES*
T HE amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted
by the Supreme Court of the United States in December, 1946,
became effective March 19, last.1 These represent the culmination
of ten years of experience in uniform simplified procedure on a na-
tionwide scale. This may well be the occasion for a little stock-
taking, with now and then a glance at state practice in New York-
always a shining target for legal reformers or scholars. The wonder
is that so few real changes were found necessary as a result of the
federal experience. Nearly all the amendments are limited to clari-
fication and re-emphasis of the original objectives. Indeed the real
innovations are limited to two concerning appeals. One reduces the
time for notice of appeal from the usual three months to 30 days in
most cases, or 60 where the United States is a party. The lengthy
delay provided by the now superseded statute-unusual in state prac-
tice-seemed unjustified, particularly in that the simple and informal
notice itself merely begins the appellate process. The other is a pro-
vision authorizing appellate courts to review cases on the original
papers-a final step, approaching the English system, in a steady
trend toward dispensing with the waste of time, expense, and brain
power caused by the ancient deification of the printed record. A
single other amendment-that dealing with impleader of third parties
-represents something of a withdrawal from an advanced position
to that steadily held in England and now in New York since the
l In view of the full discussion of these subjects in my text on CoDE PLEADING (2d
ed. 1947) and my article, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 144 (Winter, 1948), I think footnote dtations may be kept to a minimum.
* This article is the substance of an address before the Bronx County Bar Ass'n,
April 22, 1948, which was reported in the New York Law Journal, July 26, 27, 28, 1948,
with footnotes added for publication.
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revision here in 1946. The original rules provided for a citing in
at the instance of a defendant not only of a third party liable to him
solely or together with the plaintiff, but also of one liable to the
plaintiff alone. This adaptation from admiralty practice did not
prove too successful in forcing a new defendant on an unwilling
plaintiff, especially in view of the exigencies and restrictions of fed-
eral jurisdiction. It is the sole instance of retreat, and may still sug-
gest possibilities for experimentation in the states where the rigidi-
ties of federal jurisdiction do not obtain.
If, then, all the rest and the major portion of the amendments
were directed to clarification and re-emphasis of original objectives,
why was amendment considered necessary or even desirable? The
answer has an important bearing upon the issue-now of some prom-
inence in New York-of control of court procedure through court
rule-making as opposed to legislative codification. Statutory grants of
substantive rights generally ought not to be made uncertain by
changes not going to the essence, even if perhaps better worded than
the originals. Procedural code-making tends to a like difficulty, if
not rigidity. Only rarely does such a code undergo a complete and
expert revaluation and revision. Legislative tinkering with details
only hits a defect here and there and all too often confuses, rather
than darifies, the general practice. On the other hand, court rule-
making signifies continuous expert supervision of the procedural
process. Court procedure, like all routine red tape, while quite neces-
sary, does have an inveterate tendency to petrify. One cannot con-
tinue to do the same tasks recurringly without developing a routine.
That natural trend is accelerated in the courts by two factors, first
the public charge upon judges to act impartially, and not ad hoc,
among litigants, and second the American business practice of pub-
lishing and selling precedents. If I had my way, I would have no
procedural decisions published, but would leave with the lawyers
only the original rules, with such changes as a continuing committee
may suggest. But, unfortunately, as soon as a judge speaks, his words
become a commercial asset of some one else. And there is a Gresh-
am's law of procedural precedents whereby the bad drive out the
good, the technical overshadow the liberal. This is quite natural; a
restrictive interpretation calls attention to itself if only for the pitfalls
it creates or suggests, while a nonrestrictive one merely applies the
written rule. Hence to counteract this tendency and to return the
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rules to their original pristine state, as well as to clarify any ambigui-
ties, this continuing supervision is quite desirable, if not necessary,
as students have long pointed out.! Of this, too, the new federal
amendments are a practical demonstration.
In considering the system of procedural control with respect to a
state like New York, it is necessary to bear in mind not only the
advantage of this continuous supervision of the adjective processes-
the making of the dispensing of justice simple, fair, and direct-
but also the great gain of an initial general revision of procedure.
It seems almost impossible to get rid of procedural cobwebs by any-
thing short of a new start. Here the contrast between the federal and
the New York experience should be instructive. Federal practice in
the old days of conformity was one of the worst. The struggle to
secure reform was long delayed and at times seemed hopeless. But
when it came the country appeared to be prepared for it. At any
rate, the submission of successive drafts by the committee to the
fullest criticism of the profession led both to general enlightenment
and general agreement upon the program. Now there is hardly
any one to dispute that this is the best procedure in the country. One
could call upon the testimony of many, from Chief Justice Stone's
comment upon the system as "concise, simple, adaptable, and effi-
cient" and the rules as "highly successful in operation" to that of
Judge Chesnut, who, against the background of his vast experience,
has "yet to note an instance in which they have been found lacking."3
Even more convincing is the new spirit and attitude toward procedure
evinced by both bench and bar as shown by case after case. It is not
merely that they desire to comply wholeheartedly with the rules;
rather they show a developing enthusiasm for simplified procedure
as a true instrumentality to promote justice.
In New York the possibility of a like experience was opened in
1915 through the report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation
under the chairmanship of Justice A. J. Rodenbeck. This board, first
2 This is developed more extensively in my article, The Proper Function of the
Supreme Court's Federal Rules Committee, 28 A. B. A. J. 521 (1942), and my text,
CODE PLEADING 59"71 (2d ed. 1947).
3 Stone, 1 THE REcORD 144, 150 (1946); Chesnut, Improvements in Judicial Pro-
cedure, 17 CONN. B. 3. 238, 243 (1943); cf. Carey, In Favor of Uniformity, 18 TEMP.
L. Q. 145, 3 F. R. D. 505, 507 (1943) ("one of the greatest contributions to the free
and unhampered administration of law and justice ever struck off by any group of men
since the dawn of civilized law").
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
created in 1904, had been charged by specific direction of the legis-
lature in 1912 to present a detailed plan for the revision of practice.
Their report in 1915, recommending a short practice act and detailed
rules of court, following English precedents, is still one of the most
forward-looking systems yet devised. How much time and anguish,
how much saving in man-power hours to such an overworked court
as the Appellate Division, First Department, would have resulted
had that advanced system gone into effect in 1915! It is always a
source of wonder to observe how much work the New York courts
can turn off; what a boon it would have been to have avoided the
sheer burden of the infinite appeals on small procedural technicalities.
But that was not to be. The legislature created its own committee
in 1919, and the resulting hybrid of some new and much old, the
New York Civil Practice Act, was passed in 1920. Reluctantly the
State Bar Association voted to accept it as half-a-loaf and to ask the
Governor to sign it as he did. After a quarter century's experience
we may perhaps conclude that the other would have been the wiser
decision. Better it is to wait for complete reform than to accept
the paralyzing force of temporizing tinkering.4
Perhaps it may be thought ungracious of me as more or less a
visitor to the local judiciary to be thus critical of the course of the
procedural process in New York. But may I crave your indulgence to
speak more as a professor, as I was for twenty years, than as a judge,
as I have been for a mere nine years. In the latter capacity I may be
only a "ventriloquist's dummy" as to state law;5 in the former I have
become accustomed to speaking ex cathedra, daunted by neither pre-
siding justices nor chief judges in person. I started in to teach pro-
cedure at the Yale Law School about 1920, and immediately became
fascinated with the New York practice and the decisions about it.
There was so much of it and so many of them. Indeed one could
find support for practically any position he chose, such was the variety
of precedent and the lack of any uniform philosophy of pleading.
In 1925, I wrote an article, The Union of Law and Equity,' wherein
I criticized the court's emphasis, notwithstanding the code union of
4 See Clark, Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform, 24 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 121 (1940) ;
Clark, The Texas and the Federal- Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 TEx. L. REv. 4, 5
(1941); and CLARK, CODE PLEADING 47-49, 51-53, 63, 64 (2d ed. 1947).
5 As per Frank, J., Richardson v. C. I. R., 126 F. (2d) 562, 567 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
625 COL. L. REv. 1 (1925).
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1848, upon "the inherent and fundamental difference between actions
at law and suits in equity .... "' Then the New York Law Journal
started to reprint my article in installments; but my smug satisfaction
was next rudely destroyed by an editoral-I think from the gifted
pen of Professor I. Maurice Wormser-assailing me for having
launched an unjustified attack on the New York courts. Quite a
discussion then ensued among various correspondents in the columns
of that estimable publication. I remember that Francis R. Stark, distin-
guished counsel for Western Union, perhaps summed it all up by say-
ing in substance that after all the trial calendars were so far behind
that a few more digressions along procedural bypaths would not add
much to the delays of the law in New York.
My procedural education went on apace that same year in another
direction. I was teaching in the summer session at Cornell when
there was handed down the famous or infamous case of Ader v.
Blau,' where the court (Judge Cardozo dissenting) held most sur-
prisingly that when the legislature set out to adopt the English rules
of joinder of parties in the Civil Practice Act it had failed in its
objective because it had not thought to change the older restrictions
on joinder of causes of action. Judge Cuthbert Pound was staying
at Cornell that summer, and I was privileged to become intimate
with one of your greatest and most lovable judges. All that summer
we argued the merits and demerits of Ader v. Blau. I certainly con-
vinced myself that I had convinced him, and thereafter looked upon
the case as an old friend, or as almost a whipping boy for teaching
purposes. And, indeed, I might, for, although its legislative quietus
came in ten years' time, its dry bones were still shaking last No-
vember.
Indeed, the two examples I have presented, though by no means
isolated, well illustrate the vicissitudes of New York procedural
reform under present conditions. They concern the very minima of
modern practice, namely, an amalgamated procedure for the formerly
separated law and equity cases and provisions of extensive joinder
of parties and of claims. Once definitely and thoroughly established,
they cause substantially no concern or litigation, as the federal ex-
perience beautifully demonstrates. Yet approached in a halfhearted
7 Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 154, 118 N. E. 512, 513 (1917).
8 241 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771 (1925).
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and unconvinced way, they afford almost infinite possibilities of
confusion. Thus the statements on the union of law and equity in
New York are so diverse as to seem to come from different systems
of law altogether. A few months ago-a century after the merger
of law and equity written into the statutory law by David Dudley
Field and his co-codifiers-the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, decided, three to two, that where foreclosure of a mechanic's
lien could not be had (for lack of a lien) the trial judge could not
go on to enter a judgment for the amount due. The reason forsooth
was that the action was "in equity" and could not be continued "at
law."' The court cited and relied on Terner v. Glickstein & Terner,
Inc.,"0 which certainly does lend it support. It could, however, have
reached the opposite and, I submit with deference, the preferable
result by citing Wainwright & Page, Inc. v. Burr & McAuley, Inc.,'
which was not overruled by the Terner case, since it was not men-
tioned there. Elsewhere I have collected the cases turning on the
question whether a complaint should be considered or dismissed as
brought on the "wrong side of the court" on motion for judgment on
the ground of a claim of the wrong relief." This goes back to the
code provision of the New York Civil Practice Act, Section 479,
limiting relief to that demanded "if no answer is filed," which of
course should apply only in case of default of appearance as in Fed-
eral Rule 54(c).
Perhaps even more direct is the history of the joinder rule. Imme-
diately upon its inception, that hardworking and able body, your
Judicial Council, urged legislative reversal of Ader v. Blau in a
scholarly discussion in its report. So the restriction on joinder of
causes was removed by statute in 1935, and upon counterclaims in
1936. That left in force only the English provisions for free joinder.
Yet last November the Court of Appeals had to admonish lower
courts that that was not only the purpose, but also the result, of the
statutory change, and that a court could not, as a matter of law,
°Nelson v. Schrank, 273 App. Div. 72, 75 N. Y. S. (2d) 761 (2cd Dep't 1947).
-0283 N. Y. 299, 28 N. E. (2d) 846 (1940).
"272 N. Y. 130, 5 N. E. (2d) 64 (1936).
2See cases dted in CLARK, CODE PLEmiNG (2d ed. 1947), particularly at pp. 86,
87; also, Clark, Law and Equity in New York-Still Unmerged, 55 YALE L. J. 826
(1946); SHIENTAG, MouLDERs OF LEGAL THOUGHT 149 (1943).
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deny a joinder in the alternative I have noted the unusual satisfac-
tion with the existing system expressed by a committee of the State Bar
Association in criticism of the proposal then being considered by the
Judicial Council, supported by the American, City, County, and other
associations, for rule-making in the courts. I have also noted apprecia-
tively the barbs aimed against the Federal Rules by the distinguished
lawyer and teacher for whom as winning counsel the Ader case was in-
deed a professional triumph-that they constituted the "new look"
sprung "straight from the head of Jove," that the Advisory Committee
was not as democratically selected as the state Judicial Council, that
already the number of decisions suggested an increasing absence of
uniformity which the local system of interlocutory appeals would
tend to achieve.14 Such suggested criticisms are a healthy and useful
thing for the federal procedure; I only wish that he had made more
explicit his views which are thus suggested. In passing, it might be
noted that the considerable number of confirmatory decisions ex-
ploited by publishers hardly furnishes a standard to test procedural
efficacy and that a system fostering interlocutory appeals on proce-
dural points naturally overemphasizes the technical objections, as
the Ader case itself so well exemplifies. But more generally still, it
is urged with all deference that a system of procedural control must
be considered too dilatory, too weighted with the dead hand of the
past when it takes over a quarter of a century, with the help of the
Judicial Council, two legislative acts, and the Court of Appeals, to
achieve a reform rather dearly envisaged in 1921 and only then in
doubt because of errors of draftsmanship.
Let me emphasize again that my criticisms go to the system and
that I still think it a tribute to the personalities involved that so
13 Great Northern Telegraph Co. v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 297 N. Y. 135, 76
N. E. (2d) 117 (1947), reversing, 272 App. Div. 814, 72 N. Y. S. (2d) 257 (1947),
- fisc. -, 71 N. Y. S. (2d) 403 (1947).
14 See Rep. of Committee to Co-operate with the Judicial Council, 69 N. Y. ST. BAR
Ass'N REp. 342, 351-367 (1946), contra to Memorandum on Proposal to Empower the
Court of Appeals to Make Rules of Procedure for the Courts of the State of New York,
2 THE RECORD 12-26 (1947), signed on behalf of committees of the American Bar Asso-
dation, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the New York County
Lawyers' Association, and the Citizens Committee on the Courts. See also Rothschild,
Reformulating the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, 13 BROOKLYN L. REV. 14, 16, 17
(1947), and the same author's review of PamR~san, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON NEW
YORK PLEADING AN PaACTiCE, in 14 BROOKLYN L. REv. 141, 142 (1947); his
earlier justification of the Ader decision as being required-however unfortunately-by
the then code is found in 26 COL. L. REv. 30 (1926); 3 N. Y. L. REv. 429 (1925).
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much of improvement has been accomplished. The Judicial Council
has been alert and unceasing in pressing for detailed reforms, and
over the years its record is substantial. The judges seem increasingly
to be doing their part; the new local rule for pre-trial conferences,
simple, concise, and direct, is a credit to the leadership of the Council
and of the Appellate Division, First Department, and its chief, Justice
Peck. I understand, too, that it is working well, with results com-
parable to the success achieved by Judge Knox in the Southern Dis-
trict federal court. Such a showing of expert and devoted attention
to procedural reform certainly affords a guaranty of effective action
on a wider scale if the entire responsibility is committed to such
expert hands in substitution for the existing system of statutory tink-
ering.
May I now turn back directly to the Federal Rules and the new
amendments, for these, I think, sustain my thesis of the capacity of a
court-controlled system to maintain and reinforce its purpose and
intent in the light of actual experience. This general purpose may
be stated as one of de-emphasis upon pleading proper and encourage-
ment of the use of devices for quickly reaching the merits of a case.
The former is accomplished by the simplified pleading provided for
in the rules and illustrated in the attached forms, the latter by the
devices of discovery, pre-trial conferences, and summary judgments.
Some have thought to find conflict between these two approaches.
I suggest, on the other hand, that they are a part of a considered
entire program and that all are necessary to make it operate effec-
tively. In a sense we are taking procedure out of the control of the
lawyers and restoring it to the control of the courts and the use of
the parties. Indeed we have gone so far as to take away the element
of surprise. Discovery under the Federal Rules is based on the prem-
ise that it is legitimate for each side to come to court knowing all
there is to be known about the case and thus ready to present it fully
to the judge, who in turn is to make the adjudication in the full light
of disclosure thus complete and not deceptively partial.
Hence as experience has taught, it is hardly worth while to expect
sophisticated counsel by the process of setting forth "mutual alter-
cations" of fact or law, as they used to be termed, to expose their
strategy sufficiently so that the case may be boiled down to a single
essential dispute, as was the original conception of common-law
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pleading.' A shortened pleading stage, with machinery for develop-
ing the actual facts from the parties or from the witnesses, as pro-
vided by the pre-trial, the discovery, and the summary-judgment rules,
enables the court to proceed at once to the merits. The use of these
latter devices is necessary lest the very broadness and simplicity of the
pleadings prove a means whereby the weakest case may cause the
delay and expense of useless trials. Thus I regard the summary
judgment as an important corollary of the modern federal process.
If we are to take away from the litigants, as we have done, the old
demurrer, which did provide a means of raising at least formalistic
issues without a long trial, we must provide some rational substitute
for a lengthy trial of an utterly worthless case. Fairness to litigants
involves protection against abuse of process, as well as the oppor-
tunity to litigate real issues. The summary judgment well supplies
what would otherwise be a serious lacuna in the process. 6
What has happened to these principles under the newly adopted
amendments? I hope and believe that they have been made more
clearly apparent and more simply operative. Rule 16, governing
pre-trial conferences, has not been changed at all; it is being more
widely and successfully used in both federal and state practices. I
have already called attention to its utility in the Southern District
here and in New York County-and informally also in Kings County.
The discovery rules, through the process both of amendment and
of interpretation by the Supreme Court, have been clarified. This
covers various details, such as the time of seeking discovery without
court order, the integration of proceedings for protective orders in all
ta For fuller discussion see Clark, Simplified Pleading, A. B. A. JuD. ADM. MONO-
cRAPHS, Ser. A, No. 18, 27 IOWA L. REv. 272 (1942), 2 F. R. D. 456, 1942 HANDBK.
NAT. CONT. JUD. COUNCILS 136; and CLARK, CODE PLEADING 54, 56, 57, 225, 240-245
(2d ed. 1947).
'1 6 regret that some of my colleagues of the Second Circuit have expressed some
disagreement, but I think the trend of our decisions is increasingly in line with the
objective of F. R. 56, as amended, and the decisions of other circuits, e.g., Dixon v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 159 F. (2d) 863 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), cert. denied,
332 U. S. 764 (1947); Ricker v. General Electric Co., 162 F. (2d) 141 (C.C.A. 2d
1947); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr&res Soci~t6 Anonyme, 163 F. (2d) 246 (C.C.A.
2d 1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 772 (1947); Egyes v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 165 F.
(2d) 539 (C.C.A. 2d 1948) ; see also Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 235, 236 (1946) ;
Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 7 F. R. D. 324 (D. P. R. 1947); Note, 61 HARv. L. REv.
375 (1948); Note, 55 YALE L. J. 810 (1946); Note, 45 COL. L. REv. 964 (1945);
Kennedy, The Pederal Summary Judgment Rule, 13 BROOKLYN L. REV. 5 (1947);
33 A. B. A. 3. 1111, 1112 (1947) ; 34 A. B. A. 3. 187 (1948) ; ILSEN, FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 346 (Rev. ed. 1947).
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forms of discovery, together with a dearer statement of objectives.
Thus amended, Rule 26(b) states: "It is not ground for objection that
the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." And in the now famous case of Hickman v. Taylor,'1 the
Court settled the mooted question of discovery of "lawyers' files,"
i.e., of materials obtained by the lawyers in preparation of a case. It
rejected the extreme claim of complete privilege, and, while restrict-
ing discovery of such material in the ordinary situation, recognized
its occasional use where necessary to the full and fair development of
the facts in a particular case.
The other major clarification is to be found in the limitation of
the processes for the making of purely procedural objections and the
closer integration of the motions for judgment under Rule 12(b)
and (c) and for summary judgment under Rule 56. Thus the motion
for a bill of particulars has been eliminated as unnecessary and dila-
tory (Rule 12e), and an extra stage of motion and hearing for
objections to jurisdiction, venue, and process has been eliminated
(Rule 12b)." A quite interesting provision added to Rule 12(b)
and (c) is that a motion directed to the insufficiency of the plead-
ings, i.e., to pleading forms, becomes one for summary judgment, i.e.,
on the merits, when "matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court." No better illustration than this can
be found of the objective of the new rules to direct the attention of
the court to the merits, rather than to the mere surface allegations
of the parties. Unless, therefore, the court specifically limits it to
the face of the pleadings (as it still may wish to do when the issues
are purely legal or when other factors, such as delay of a party, make
such a course the fairer), the case automatically turns into a search
for the real problems which divide the parties."
137 329 U. S. 495 (1947).
18 Thus making impossible the wasteful successive appeals in cases such as Miller v.
National City Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d) 798 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) and 166 F. (2d)
723 (C.C.A. 2d 1948), and W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 155 F.
(2d) 321 (C.C.A. 2d 1946), and Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp.,
167 F. (2d) 9 (C.C.A. 2d 1948), where the earlier reversals of district court dismissals
for lack of jurisdiction led only to ultimate afirmance in each case for lack of legal
claim, when that issue was at length presented.
" Among amendments not specially noted here, particular reference may be made to
amended Rule 54(b), clarifying the rule of final judgments and thus the determination
of appealability of orders and judgments. See Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum Heat & Power
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To the student of procedure as to the judge, and I believe the
lawyer also, all these developments, especially the informed and
aroused interest in the profession to accept responsibility for im-
provement in judicial administration, come as the dawn of a new
day. I hope it means the development of a real procedural juris-
prudence in the sense not of abstract formulas, but rather of a phi-
losophy which defines appropriate objectives and then creates natural
means for their achievement. And I hope it means a lessening of
"procedural particularism" whereby abstract proceduralisms are con-
cocted almost ad hoc to decide cases, it is true, but, in so doing, to
conceal and confuse the judicial process."0
Charles E. Clark
Nnw HA EN, CONN.
Co., 162 F. (2d) 327 (C.CA. 2d 1947); Clark v. Taylor, 163 F. (2d) 940 (C.C.A.
2d 1947); Canister Co. v. National Can Corp., 163 F. (2d) 683 (C.C.A. 3d 1947);
Western Contracting Corp. v. National Surety Corp., 163 F. (2d) 456 (C.C. 4th
1947) ; Note, 47 COL. L REv. 239, 254 (1947) ; Note, 56 YALE L. J. 141 (1946);
ILsEN, EDERAL RULES OF CIVL PRocEDUR 439 (Rev. ed. 1947).
2 0 For discussion of "procedural particularism" see my article, note 1 supra and my
teXt, CODE PLEADING 59, 69-71 (2d ed. 1947).
